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INTRODUCTION
Climate change may have unanticipated consequences; so too might climate policy.
Suppose that government levies a tax on the carbon content of fuel. Doing so is intended
to alter levels and patterns of energy use and thereby reduce greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions. At the same time, however, the tax will alter levels of other emissions – e.g.,
particulate matter, SO2, NOx, volatile organic compounds (VOCs), carbon monoxide
(CO), and lead – all of which are associated with fossil fuel combustion. This in turn will
affect local air quality and the health of the population. When analysts calculate the costs
and benefits of climate policy, to a large extent they ignore any “ancillary benefits
(costs)” in terms of changes in local pollution damages. This tends to bias any policy
prescriptions flowing from such analyses towards a “wait-and-see” stance, since
abatement costs (the costs of reducing CO2 and other GHG emissions) are incurred
almost immediately, while the benefits of climate change averted are not only distant in
time but highly uncertain. Meanwhile, policy makers have many pressing near-term
development (and even environmental) priorities to which to attend. Yet the impacts of
climate policy on local pollution are real and, in principle at least, measurable. Recently,
considerable attention has been devoted by the climate economics community to trying to
arrive at plausible estimates of the magnitude of such ancillary benefits (cf. papers in
OECD 2000b), in order to compare them with abatement costs and determine what scope
there may be for “no regrets” GHG control measures.  
This paper describes work that the OECD Development Centre has undertaken in the past
two years to devise and implement a methodology for ancillary benefits estimation in
developing countries, using economy-wide models. Section 1 presents a simple analytical
framework for integrating ancillary benefits into climate economics. Section 2 then
motivates the use of so-called “top-down” models for the analysis, weighing their
advantages and disadvantages vis-à-vis “bottom-up” engineering-based models. It also
describes the basic structure of the CGE model. Section 3 describes the other modules
needed for the analysis, including the air dispersion model and the dose-response
functions. Section 4 addresses questions of valuation of ancillary health effects, including
the issues raised by benefits transfer across countries. Section 5 presents the welfare
analysis resulting from the climate policy experiment and sensitivity analysis for India.
These results are compared with others in the literature. Section 6 summarises and points
in a few directions for future research. 
1. SIMPLE ANALYTICS OF CARBON ABATEMENT COSTS AND ANCILLARY BENEFITS 
In the simplest terms, climate policy can be thought of as any measure or set of measures
designed to constrain an economy’s net GHG emissions below some baseline. For
developed country Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, that baseline is usually 1990 emissions.
For a developing country, it might be a business-as-usual (BAU) growth baseline. (Note:
for simplicity, the discussion here is in terms of CO2 emissions, but it could be extended
to a multi-gas assessment; see OECD 2000a for one example.)   
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Figure 1.A presents a stylised picture of how total costs vary with abatement, suggesting
that they increase at an increasing rate – i.e., the marginal abatement cost curve is convex
to the origin. The figure also depicts a stylised ancillary benefits curve, which is shown as
a ray from the origin (by definition, with zero abatement there are zero ancillary
benefits), with the constant slope assuming – as a first approximation – the linearity of
underlying dose-response functions and absence of any minimum exposure threshold.
The epidemiological literature on mortality and morbidity effects of particulate exposure
is broadly consistent with these assumptions; in any case, both the ex ante and ex post
exposure levels in the cities of the developing countries studied here (Chile, India) are
well above any possible threshold. The figure and the analysis abstract from the primary
benefits of climate change averted, not because they are considered insignificant1, but
because they are judged to be too uncertain and distant in time to influence substantially
policy making in most developing countries. The inclusion of primary benefits would
complicate the analysis (bringing to the fore the question of choice of discount rate, since
primary benefits occur some way in the future) but would not fundamentally alter the
framework. (The addition of primary benefits in Figure 1.A. would shift the benefits
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Through inversion of the net cost curve in Figure 1.1.A, we get the net benefits curve in
Figure 1.1.B; as drawn, these are positive over some range, peaking at abatement rate a
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before declining towards zero at point b (the so-called “no regrets” threshold) before
turning negative.  An “optimal” climate policy would seek to maximise the net benefits
(again bearing in mind the absence from consideration of primary climate benefits), so
“optimal” abatement would be lower than the maximum “no regrets” rate.
The costs depicted in Figure 1.1 are those of limiting an economy’s emissions of CO2,
which can be done through one or more of the following: (a) reducing the overall level of
economic activity; (b) reducing the energy-intensity of a given set of activities; (c) fuel
switching from high-carbon to low-carbon fuel or carbon-free energy sources for a given
level of energy use; (d) reallocating resources away from energy-intensive sectors. If the
economy is operating efficiently in an initial equilibrium, any one of these actions
involves an opportunity cost. It is only if one assumes pre-existing inefficiencies – e.g., in
energy input use – that the gross abatement cost curve would dip below the x-axis over an
initial range of abatement. In this event, the net cost curve also shifts down proportionally
and the “no regrets” abatement range is further increased. 
The ancillary benefits curve is a construct involving several intermediate steps between
the policy shock and the change in welfare, as measured by equivalent variation (the
functional specification of the welfare change is given below). These steps are depicted in
Figure 1.2. The crucial link in the chain is from the climate policy (say, a carbon tax) to
the impact on other pollutants. Taking particulates for purposes of illustration, we need to
know how a carbon tax – levied for example on the carbon content of fuel – translates
into reductions in particulate emissions, in other words, the cross price elasticity of
particulates with respect to carbon (ξpc). The higher is ξpc, the greater will be the effect on
particulate emissions of a given carbon tax. What determines the value of ξpc? Most
importantly, it depends on the extent to which the two pollutants have been “de-linked”
through prior particulate pollution controls – i.e., the enforcement of particulate standards
and the resultant behavioural changes of polluters, e.g., through installation of end-of-
stack capture technologies. 
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Figure 1.2: Links in chain from policy measure to welfare change
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It is generally the case that the high-income OECD countries have gone farther than
developing countries in controlling local pollution emissions, with the result that ξpc
values are likely on average to be lower in the former than in the latter. If so, this
suggests a hypothesis about the relationship between a given carbon tax and the size of
expected ancillary benefits, viz., that the lower a country’s per capita income, ceteris
paribus, the larger are the effects of a carbon tax on local pollution, hence the bigger the
ancillary benefits (measured as changes in health endpoints per tonne of carbon
reduction). Formally, 
(rgdp)i  < (rgdp)j ⇒ (ξpc)i > (ξpc)j ⇒ (ABi| tc)> (ABj| tc)
where rgdp,i,j refers to real per capita GDP of any two countries i and j, tc is the carbon
tax rate and ABi,j are the ancillary benefits for countries i and j (measured in physical
units – e.g., premature deaths avoided per tonne carbon reduction).  Whether this
translates into larger monetised welfare gains depends on the relative incomes of the two
countries and, by implication, their willingness to pay (WTP) for the expected health
improvements. 
Figure 1.3 presents this analysis in graphical terms, showing the marginal abatement cost
curves for local pollution for a low-income country (MAC) and a high-income country
(MAC*). The latter is shifted to the left because of the prior abatement of local pollution,
so the response to a carbon tax already finds the high-income country on the steeply
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ascending portion of its marginal abatement cost curve. Also in the high-income country,
because of the relatively low cross price elasticity of carbon and local pollution, a given
carbon tax translates into a lower effective tax on the latter – te* versus te. The
combination of these two effects implies a lower post-tax equilibrium level of local
pollution abatement, hence, lower ancillary benefits in the high-income country than in
the low-income one.
Figure 1.3: Marginal Abatement Costs and Rates 
for Local Pollutants, Developed and Developing Countries
 MAC
    $
MAC* MAC
   te
   te*
Abatement rate (%)
One possible complication is that the imposition of a carbon tax may not be the most
efficient way to achieve a given reduction in local pollution. In other words, while the
MAC curve traces out the path of incremental costs assuming that lower cost abatement
options are always chosen before higher cost ones, some of those options may not
become relevant in the face of a tax on carbon, viz., those options that lower emissions of
the local pollutant without affecting carbon emissions (or perhaps even increasing carbon
emissions). The question of how important these options are likely to be is ultimately an
empirical one. End-of-pipe particulate capture technologies are one example: not only do
they not reduce carbon emissions, but the fuel used to run the equipment may actually
raise those emissions somewhat.  A few studies have sought to examine the degree of
correlation between cost-effective local pollution control technologies and cost-effective
carbon abatement ones.  
Eskeland and Xie (1997) compare various abatement technologies for mobile source air
pollution in Mexico City, in terms of cost effectiveness in reducing a weighted local
toxicity index versus reducing GHG emissions. They find that, excluding shifts in
transport mode and demand management measures (e.g., a pollution tax on motor fuels),
the rank correlation between local cost-effectiveness and global cost-effectiveness is
rather weak. Out of some 26 identified control measures, stricter motor vehicle emission
standards are the ones exhibiting the highest correlation in the two sorts of cost-
effectiveness, largely because these standards would improve the fuel efficiency of
gasoline-powered vehicles. Whether imposition of an environmental fuel tax would have
to be part of a cost-effective strategy for local pollution control depends critically on the
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own-price elasticity of demand for polluting fuels. In another study for Mexico, Eskeland
and Feyzioğlu (1997) find that both in the short term and in the medium term demand for
gasoline is fairly price-elastic, suggesting that a pollution-related gasoline tax would yield
a rather strong behavioural response and would thus be a cost-effective policy instrument
for realising local air quality improvements. A review of demand elasticity estimates for
gasoline (Dahl 1995) supports the result that a tax could be a potent environmental policy
instrument.      
Cifuentes et al. perform a similar exercise for Santiago, Chile, but show a much stronger
association between cost-effectiveness in the two dimensions (reduction in local
pollution, as measured by PM2.5, and reduction in carbon emissions) (see EPA 2000). In a
diagram showing rank order of cost-effectiveness of different technical options along the
two axes, a large proportion of such options (which unlike in Eskeland and Xie are not
limited to transport) cluster along the 45-degree line, suggesting that those ranking high
in PM2.5 cost-effectiveness do likewise in carbon cost-effectiveness. Of particular interest
is the price sensitivity of some technical options, with the conversion of buses to
compressed natural gas (CNG) looking very promising in terms of both types of cost-
effectiveness at 1999 prices, but far less attractive in terms of PM2.5 abatement cost-
effectiveness at the higher 2000 gas prices. 
Lvovsky et al. (1999) take a slightly different approach, comparing different control
strategies in terms of their local and global environmental benefits. They find – given the
nature of the model relating particulate emissions from different sources to ambient
concentrations and population exposure (of which, see further discussion in the next
chapter) – that those measures that have the largest local benefits in terms of reduced
health impacts (e.g., control of emissions from small stoves and boilers and of diesel
motor vehicle emissions) do not yield the largest global benefits (in terms of GHG
reductions), for which electricity fuel switching is far more important. 
 
2. THE ECONOMIC MODEL
The analysis of climate policy is inherently interdisciplinary. In this paper, we are
concerned primarily with the economics of climate policy, but elements of other
disciplines like engineering, atmospheric sciences, health sciences, and agronomy
inevitably enter into the picture. 
2.1. TOP-DOWN VERSUS BOTTOM-UP MODELLING APPROACHES
There are two basic modelling approaches to estimating the costs and benefits of climate
policy – “bottom-up” engineering models and “top-down” economy-wide models. The
former tend to based on least-cost technical options while the latter focus more on
behavioural responses to price and income changes.
In principle, one would expect the two approaches to yield broadly identical results, since
they refer to the same set of economic agents and technologies. In practice, however,
“bottom-up” models tend to yield lower abatement cost estimates than “top-down” ones.
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Kolstad and Toman (2001) offer a plausible explanation along the following lines.
Beginning with a given policy shock (say, a gasoline tax), the former approach would list
all the technically feasible ways of reducing gasoline consumption in response to the
shock, including seemingly costless responses like trip consolidation. The latter approach
begins from observation of actual past behavioural responses to gasoline price changes to
estimate what the reaction would be to this new policy shock. That response depends on
how vehicle use enters into consumers’ utility functions, e.g., how they value time and
convenience. Advocates of a “bottom-up” approach would argue that past behaviour is
not necessarily a reliable guide to future behaviour, that if people were educated about
how they could save energy at little or no cost they would choose to do so. The “top-
down” approach essentially takes the current state of knowledge as a given, implicitly
assuming that information about cost-saving opportunities is complete.
One might argue that the “bottom-up” approach is patently more realistic in allowing for
changes in people’s state of knowledge. The main limitation of this approach, however, is
that it is not able to capture the full complexity of economic interactions in a consistent
framework. This is the strength of “top-down” models, notably computable general
equilibrium (CGE) models. They become especially useful when one would like to
simulate the effects of something like a carbon tax or an emissions cap, since these will
have economy-wide effects. To be able to compare economy-wide costs with benefits
(ancillary or otherwise), one needs to be able to see the big picture, to consider not only
technical possibilities but behavioural relationships, not only sector-specific abatement
options but cross-sectoral shifts in resource allocation.   
 
2.2. MODEL STRUCTURE
Our CGE model structure derives originally from the OECD’s GREEN model (see
Burniaux et al., 1992), which is a multi-region global model for simulating climate policy.
GREEN has been adapted for use at the Development Centre, with a number of progeny
in the form of country-specific models for environment-economy analysis (cf. Beghin,
Dessus, Roland-Holst and van der Mensbrugghe, 1996). The basic technical coefficients
in the various country models used for our analysis (Chile, China, India) are derived from
social accounting matrices (SAMs) built, inter alia, from input-output tables, national
accounts, industry surveys, and household expenditure surveys. These matrices show the
flows of income and expenditure in the economy in the base year, including intermediate
input purchases by each sector. Figure 2.1 presents a simplified SAM, with sector of
origin in columns and sector of destination in rows. 
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Figure 2.1: Simple SAM Structure and Accounting Relationships
Suppl. Househ. Gov. CapAcc. ROW
1 2 3 4 5
1 Suppliers IC C G I E Demand
2 Households Y Income
3 Government T Receipts
4 Capital Account Sh Sg Sf Savings
5 Rest Of the World M Imports
Supply Expend Expend Investment ForExchg
1) Y +M = C + G + I + E GNP: Value Added + Imports 
        = Consumption + Gov Expenditure + Investment + Exports
2) C + T + Sh = Y Domestic Income: C + Direct Taxes + Hh Savings = Income
3) G + Sg = T Government budget: G + Gov. Savings = T
4) I = Sh + Sg + Sf Investment - Saving: I = Sh + Sg + Foreign Savings
5) E + Sf = M Foreign Balance
The behaviour of economic agents is modelled according to neo-classical assumptions of
utility- and profit-maximisation. All markets clear at equilibrium prices. The economy
consists of multiple production sectors but there is only a single representative household
(this last assumption can of course be relaxed with sufficient micro data on household
expenditure classes). 
Production and Capital Accumulation
The model structure is dynamic recursive: dynamic in that a change in current period
savings volume influences capital accumulation in the following period; recursive in that
agents are assumed to be myopic, basing their consumption and investment decisions on
current prices and quantities rather than expectations about future ones. Exogenous
growth rates are assumed for various other factors that affect the growth path of the
economy, such as population and labour supply, labour and capital productivity, and
energy efficiency (see discussion below).  
Capital is putty/semi-putty, with the installed base enjoying lower substitution
possibilities than new investment. In each sector, production is undertaken according to a
nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES), constant returns to scale (CRS)
production function; the nesting is shown schematically in Figure 2.2. The old vintage
and new vintage substitution elasticities are given in parentheses at each branch point.
For example, within the energy nest, existing fuels substitute for one another with an
elasticity of 0.2 while with new energy investment the inter-fuel substitution elasticity
rises to 2.0. [Note that intermediates have zero substitution possibilities among
themselves; this is because of the fixed (Leontief) coefficients of the I/O tables. A more
sophisticated analysis would relax this assumption, e.g., by estimating econometrically
the substitution elasticities among intermediate inputs in response to relative price
changes, using historical I/O tables. McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1995) have done this for
the United States using I/O tables extending from 1958 to 1982.] 
These substitution elasticities are crucial to the determination of abatement costs (in the
broad sense of total welfare losses following a policy shock, before accounting for
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external benefits). The higher are substitution elasticities, ceteris paribus, the lower will
be the costs of adjustment to the new policy equilibrium. Since those elasticities differ
markedly between old vintage and new vintage capital, this implies that the costs will be
lower the higher the investment rate, hence, the faster the turnover of the capital stock.
This is the main reason why most global models show GHG abatement costs to be lower
in major developing countries than in developed countries. 
F ig u r e  2 .2 :  P r o d u c t io n  N e s t in g
P r o d u c tio n
    σ  =  (  0 .0  ;  0 .5  )
N o n  E n e r g y  In te r m e d ia te  D e m a n d  B u n d le C a p ita l  L a b o u r  E n e r g y  B u n d le
  σ  =  (  0 .1  ;  1 .0  )
             L a b o u r  C a p ita l  E n e r g y  B u n d le
                                   σ  =  (  0 .0  ;  0 .8  )
  
C a p ita l E n e r g y
            σ  =  (  0 .2  ;  2 .0  )     
  C o a l R e fin e d  P e tr o le u m E le c tr ic ity   G a s
N o te s :
1 . E a c h  n e s t  re p re s e n ts  a  d if fe re n t  C E S  b u n d le . S u b st itu t io n  e la s t ic it ie s  s e p a ra te d  b y  a  s e m i-c o lo n  in d ic a te ,  re s p e c t iv e ly ,
th e  c e n t ra l C E S  su b s t itu t io n  e la s t ic ity  fo r  o ld  c a p ita l a n d  fo r  n e w  c a p i ta l.  T h e  e la s t ic i ty  m a y  ta k e  th e  v a lu e  z e ro .
B e c a u s e  o f  th e  p u t ty / s e m i-p u t ty  s p e c ific a tio n , th e  n e s t in g  is  re p lic a te d  fo r  e a c h  ty p e  o f  c a p i ta l, i .e . o ld  a n d  n e w .  T h e
v a lu e s  o f  th e  s u b s t itu t io n  e la s t ic i ty  w ill g e n e ra l ly  d iffe r  d e p e n d in g  o n  th e  c a p i ta l v in ta g e , w ith  ty p ic a lly  lo w e r
e la s t ic it ie s  fo r  o ld  c a p i ta l.
2 . In te rm e d ia te  d e m a n d , b o th  e n e rg y  a n d  n o n -e n e rg y , is  fu rth e r  d e c o m p o s e d  b y  re g io n  o f  o r ig in  a c c o rd in g  to  th e
A rm in g to n  s p e c if ic a t io n . H o w e v e r ,  th e  A rm in g to n  fu n c t io n  is  s p e c if ie d  a t th e  b o rd e r  a n d  is  n o t  in d u stry  s p e c if ic .
An important issue in a developing country context is how a given climate policy is likely
to affect the substitution between traditional fuels (e.g. fuelwood, crop residue, animal
dung, other biomass) and various commercial energy sources. For instance, if the main
commercial cooking fuel in rural areas is either natural gas or kerosene, and if a carbon
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tax should raise its relative price, poor households especially may prefer to revert to using
biomass fuels. In that case, there could well be an adverse health effect on a sizeable
segment of the population from increased indoor air pollution (cf. Smith 1993). As
Shukla (1996) observes, this sort of inter-fuel substitution is normally overlooked in the
models developed for OECD countries. The author is not aware of any credible estimates
of substitution elasticities between these non-commercial fuels and commercial fuels in
developing countries. Ideally, one would want to model the non-commercial fuel sector,
but the absence of a separate biomass fuel sector2 from the underlying I/O tables makes
this infeasible for present purposes.    
Income Distribution and Household Utility
Labour income is allocated to the representative household. Likewise capital revenues are
distributed among households, corporations and the rest of the world. Corporations save
and invest the after-tax residual of that revenue. Private consumption demand is obtained
through maximisation of a household utility function following the Extended Linear
Expenditure System (Lluch, 1973). Household utility, a function of consumption of
different goods and saving, is not influenced by environment quality. The ELES
specification of utility avoids the limitations of CGE models that assume Cobb-Douglas
or Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility. The latter two imply unitary income
elasticity of demand, thus failing to account for the way changes in income can affect the
structural adjustment of the economy to exogenous shocks. Income elasticities differ by
product, varying in a range from 0.50 for basic agricultural products to 1.30 for services.
Thus, following Engel’s law, with rising disposable income a progressively smaller
fraction gets spent on food. 
International Trade
The model assumes imperfect substitution among goods originating from different
geographical areas (Armington 1969). Import demand results from a CES aggregation
function of domestic and imported goods. Export supply is symmetrically modelled as a
Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function. Producers decide to allocate their
output to domestic or foreign markets responding to relative prices. Elasticities between
domestic and foreign products are of comparable magnitude for import demand and
export supply. Their values are 3.00 for agricultural goods, 2.00 for manufactured goods
and 1.50 for services. The small country assumption holds, Chile being unable to change
world prices; thus, its imports and exports prices are exogenous. Capital transfers are
exogenous as well. The balance of payments equilibrium therefore determines the final
value for the current account.
Model Closure
















On one side of the balance sheet are exports, evaluated at world prices, and net foreign
saving. On the other side of the balance sheet are imports evaluated at world prices
(excluding tariffs). Any price in the model can be chosen as the numéraire. In this case,
the foreign saving price index, PSAVF, has been designated as the numéraire, and its value
is always set to 1. Note that if imports exceed exports, then net foreign savings are
positive (representing net foreign borrowing) and equal to the difference.  
Other closure conditions apply to the government budget deficit and total
savings/investment balance. The government budget surplus/deficit is taken as exogenous
and the household income tax schedule shifts in order to achieve the predetermined net
government position. Total investment must equal the sum of savings originating from
households, government and rest of the world. 
Emissions
Emissions are principally determined by intermediate or final consumption of polluting
inputs, mostly fossil fuels. In addition, certain industries have emissions not directly
linked to input consumption but related instead to their output levels (e.g., fugitive
emissions, as with natural gas leakage and volatile organic compounds). It is assumed
that labour and capital do not pollute. Emission coefficients associated with each type of
consumption and production are derived originally from the World Bank’s IPPS project,
which used toxic release inventory (TRI) data to establish sectoral pollution intensities
for the United States (see Hettige et al., 1995). Output-based emissions coefficients have
one major drawback, viz., that – once fixed –they do not allow a given output to be
produced with fewer emissions, e.g., by using a different input mix. The only way to
reduce emissions is to reduce output. In reality, for most air pollutants, there are three
main ways of lowering sectoral emissions: in addition to reducing output, one can alter
the input mix, e.g., consuming fewer polluting inputs, or capture the pollutants at the end
of the stack through an abatement technology. While few CGE models incorporate an
abatement technology (for an exception see Garbaccio et al. 2000, who assume an
exogenous rate of abatement technology advance), such models do allow for a variety of
substitutions away from polluting inputs, e.g.: low-carbon fuels for high-carbon fuels;
non-fossil fuel energy for fossil fuels; non-energy inputs for energy (e.g., installation of
process control equipment); energy-conserving inputs for energy-using inputs; less
energy-intensive goods for more energy-intensive ones (e.g., more durable and recyclable
plastics); finally, imports of energy-intensive goods for domestic production of same
(Jorgenson et al. 2000).   
Dessus et al. (1994) transform these output-based intensities into input-based coefficients
by regressing sectoral emissions on sectoral input use, with the unallocated portion of
emissions (the residual) attributed to pure process emissions. Formally, the total amount
of a given polluting emission takes the following form:






= + +∑∑ ∑ ∑α β α,
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where i is the sector index, j the consumed product index, C intermediate consumption,
XP output, XA final consumption, αj the emission volume associated with one unit
consumption of product j and βi the emission volume associated with one unit production
of sector i. Thus, the first two elements of the right hand side expression represent
production-related emissions, the third one consumption-related emissions. 
There are six air pollutants considered in the analysis of climate policy and its ancillary
benefits: carbon dioxide (CO2) – the main greenhouse gas, total suspended particulates,
sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), volatile organic compounds (VOCs), and
carbon monoxide (CO). 
Energy Efficiency Improvements
Whereas bottom up models very often find scope for “win-win” technical improvements
– e.g., in energy efficiency – that both reduce costs and improve the environment, CGE
models start from the assumption that market actors are already making optimal choices
about whether and when to use specific technologies (Edmonds et al. 2000). If a
technology is not being employed this is because it is not profitable to do so. That having
been said, most CGE models have their own version of “win-win” in the form of energy-
saving technical progress, or costless energy savings, reflected in an autonomous energy
efficiency improvement (AEEI) factor. The AEEI rate is normally set to reflect recent
historical experience and some judgment about its likely sustainability. One rationale for
incorporating AEEI into the analysis is the recognition that technological improvements,
even if initially stimulated by price changes, persist even after the stimulus has been
removed or diminished. Thus, once many energy efficiency improvements were
introduced in response to the 1970s oil shocks, they came to dominate earlier
technologies. In principle, it would be possible to endogenise the rate of AEEI by making
it vary with energy price changes. Ideally, one would like to be able fully to endogenise
energy efficiency and other technological improvements, making them responsive not
just to relative price changes but to R&D expenditures, induced in part of course by those
changes but more generally by the expectation of higher profits3. To do so requires,
however, much firmer empirical evidence than currently exists on the way various factors
influence not just the rate and direction of innovation but its commercial adoption. The
returns to investment in new technology are usually highly uncertain. 
Policy Instruments
There are essentially two sorts of flexible instrument for climate policy, carbon taxes and
quantitative restrictions with tradable permits. In choosing between the two, the degree of
uncertainty facing policy makers regarding the abatement cost and benefits functions
needs to be considered. Suppose for the moment that the positions of both the ancillary
benefits curve and the abatement cost curve are uncertain. As Weitzman (1974) has
shown, mis-estimation of the benefits curve will result in equivalent welfare losses
whether a tax or a permit scheme is used. In the case of a mis-estimated abatement cost
curve, however, which instrument is preferred depends on the relative slopes of the
marginal benefits and marginal cost curves (see exposition in Baumol and Oates 1988). If
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the cost curve is steeper than the benefits curve, a tax yields smaller welfare losses than a
permit scheme. Indeed, this is the case here, with marginal ancillary benefits being almost
constant in abatement (a function of the linearity of the underlying relationships), while
abatement costs rise steeply beyond some modest level of abatement. Thus, we choose to
implement the climate policy as a tax on carbon content of fuels sufficient to achieve a
given CO2 reduction relative to a growth baseline. The final year for the climate policy
simulation is 2010, the mid-point of the first Kyoto Protocol control period. One could
also consider a longer time horizon, say, to 2020. The effect would be to lower the costs
of achieving any given CO2 reduction target relative to 2010, since more capital stock
could be turned over. At the same time, ancillary benefits of climate policy would also be
reduced, since the AEEI would have another decade in which to reduce the energy
intensity of GDP. 
The effect of a carbon tax on the economy depends importantly on two factors: (i) prior
tax-induced or other economic distortions, with which the carbon tax may interact; (ii)
the way in which revenues from the tax are recycled. Where prior distortions are present,
the carbon tax may either amplify them or mute them, in the latter case yielding a
“double dividend”. In the absence of distortions, the tax ought to be designed so as not to
introduce new ones. This would normally call for a lump-sum transfer of revenues back
to households, e.g., via a reduction in direct taxes. This is indeed the basic recycling rule
employed here. 
Welfare
There are two sorts of welfare change that need to be evaluated in the current context:
those resulting from changes in prices of goods and services resulting from the
introduction of a carbon tax; those resulting from changes in expenditure required to
maintain a given state of health. The latter, in turn, can be broken into morbidity-related
expenditures and mortality-related expenditures. The former include primarily the costs
of self-medication and institutional medical care, though they also include the
opportunity cost of time lost to illness or restricted activity. These are collectively
referred to as the “costs of illness” and a lower bound is given by the observable costs of
treatment, which represent real expenditures on the services of the health care sector and
the products of the pharmaceutical industry. The latter refer primarily to the willingness
to pay for reduced risk of premature death. This WTP for reduced mortality risk does not
correspond to any readily observable market transactions and, for this reason, we
normally rely on indirect measures like contingent valuation surveys or hedonic wage
studies. 
Where costs-of-illness estimates exist, these welfare changes can be endogenised in the
model by assuming that, with lower pollution levels, a smaller outlay is required on
health care expenditures to maintain a given health status of the population. Those
reduced health-care expenditures free up resources to be spent on other goods and
services. Mortality benefits, on the other hand, are treated exogenously from the CGE
modelling framework. This requires the imposition of separability conditions on
individuals’ utility functions, implying that the utility of reduced mortality risk is
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independent of the consumption levels of various commodities (Boyd et al. 1995). Also,
it should be noted that changes in the health status of the population and in mortality are
assumed not to have a significant effect on the supply of labour (this assumption could of
course be relaxed). 
The welfare change from a climate policy experiment consists of three parts, as shown in
the following equation for period t: 
)*(*)),(*)*,(()*( DDupEupEyyW −−−−−=∆
where y is disposable income, p the price system, u is utility, E the health expenditure
function, D the monetary value of the change in mortality (Deaths), and the star exponent
denotes the with-policy state. The first term, y* – y, is the conventional equivalent
variation (EV) measure of welfare change, calculated endogenously by the model (see
definition in Kolstad 2000, p.303) and equivalent to the household disposable income
loss – (y* - y) – in the new equilibrium evaluated at the new set of relative prices. The
second term represents the difference in health care expenditures required to achieve the
improved with policy health status (the second term, with a negative sign). The third term
represents the change in mortality induced by the policy, evaluated at the so-called “value
of a statistical life” (VSL4) (if premature mortality goes down as expected, this term is
also negative).  Whether the overall welfare change of a given policy is positive or
negative depends on the relative magnitudes of the first term (the measured income losses
from the carbon tax) and the next two terms combined (the ancillary benefits). Thus, the
maximum “no regrets” abatement of CO2 is given by:
(y* - y) = (E(p*,u*) - E(p,u*)) - (D* - D) .
 
3. MODELLING DISPERSION AND CONCENTRATION, EXPOSURE AND DAMAGES 
 
A CGE modelling framework poses no problem for the analysis of the costs and primary
benefits of global climate policy, since GHGs are truly global externalities, with the
location of emissions having no bearing on temperature rise and the greenhouse effect.
Ancillary benefits are quite different, however, in that they tend to rather localised. As a
result, spatial detail of the models matters much more. Most CGE models, however, are
not designed for analysis below the level of the national economy. This limits their
usefulness in ancillary benefits analysis. The emissions generated by the economic model
have no spatial markers (they are simply “national” emissions), so how does one know
the respective contributions of different sources to air pollution in a specific city or other
area of concern? Geographic location of emissions, stack heights of emitting sources,
local temperature and meteorological conditions, population distribution and location of
valuable assets vulnerable to pollution damage all matter to the nature and size of
impacts5. In an ideal world, all these data would be available and one could employ a
complex air dispersion model to map sources to concentrations at different locations.
With only limited data, we are living in a second-best world where shortcuts are
inevitable Below we describe the simplified dispersion model used for our analysis. 
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Geographically localised ancillary benefits studies are able to incorporate more
sophisticated dispersion models – e.g., of the Gaussian plume variety (see Colls 1997,
ch.3, for a presentation of the Gaussian model with worked examples). This approach,
which is rather data-intensive, is adopted in Cifuentes et al. (1999) for Santiago, Chile.
From an economic perspective, the limitation of such studies is that climate policy is
usually decided at national level by decision-makers interested in economy-wide costs
and benefits which city-level or other local-level analyses cannot capture.  
3.1. DISPERSION MODELLING
In the case where one is working with a single national CGE model, the question is what
proportion of emissions from any given sector are having a significant impact on air
quality, say, in a major metropolis. This is the problem we confronted in the case of Chile
(Dessus and O’Connor 2001). While Santiago is not the only important city in Chile, it is
by far the largest and suffers some of the severest air pollution. Thus, a decision was
made to focus on Santiago and the national emissions numbers were scaled down, sector-
by-sector, according to the share of a sector’s output that is produced in the Santiago
metropolitan area. Santiago emissions (say of particulates) were then linked to average
yearly concentration via a linear dispersion equation, with the intercept term representing
the background particulate level (i.e., the level that would occur “naturally”).
Concentration data are available from readings taken by monitoring equipment. While
emissions are generated by the model, a cross check against an independent emissions
inventory showed broad consistency. The one missing link is exposure. To account for
this, rather than a simple average annual concentration, we calculated a weighted
average, where the weights for each monitoring station reading are the shares of the
Santiago population living in the vicinity of that station (and the weights sum to 1). 
 
CONC  = 
∑ ii CONCwn
1
, where ∑ = 1iw
In the case of India, a large country with many polluted cities, a somewhat more
sophisticated approach was taken. First, four regional economic models were constructed,
giving rise to regional emissions. Then, these were linked to weighted average
concentrations in each region’s major city (or cities), using an equation like that above.
Finally, rather than a single dispersion coefficient linking emissions to concentration, a
model was used in which sources are differentiated by stack height (Garbaccio et al. 2000
employ a similar approach for China, but with a single national economic model).
Economic sectors are grouped according to whether their emissions normally occur at or
near ground level (e.g., small-scale industry, motor vehicles, household cooking), come
from stacks of medium height (medium- to large-scale industry), or from high stacks
(power plants) (classification based on Lvovsky and Hughes 1998). In short, the
dispersion function (for particulates) is of the form:
CONCTSP  =  a + b1 (EMISHigh) + b2 (EMISMedium) + b3 (EMISLow),
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where CONCTSP refers to the weighted average city-wide concentration and EMISHigh, Medium,
Low the region-wide emissions from each of three groups of sectors differentiated by
typical stack height. The constant a is an approximation of the effect of background
emissions on ambient concentration. The bis are the dispersion coefficients for emissions
from each stack height, calculated using a simple dispersion model in which different
atmospheric conditions are assumed to occur with given frequencies6 and the key piece of
additional data required is a metropolitan area’s radius (see WHO 1989 for the original
model and Lvovsky et al. 1999 for an application in six cities). The use of even this
somewhat more sophisticated dispersion model still involves a gross simplifying
assumption, viz., that the specific geographic distribution of emission sources within the
area does not significantly affect area-average pollutant concentration.
The WHO-type model yields the following results (see Figure 3.1): (i) for low and
medium height sources, the concentration/exposure per unit of emissions is strictly
inversely related to the city’s radius – in other words, the wider the area over which
emissions are dispersed, the smaller their effect on average ambient concentration; (ii) the
emissions-exposure relationship for high-stack emissions follows an inverted-U shape in
the city’s radius, as high stacks contribute more widely to area emissions than low- or
medium-stack emissions, so the contribution to area-average exposure rises at first with
city size; and (iii) high-stack sources yield a concentration/exposure per unit of emissions
very far below low-stack emissions for virtually any size of city and significantly below
medium-stack emissions until city size approaches a radius of 30 km (in other words, a
very large city). This suggests that the magnitude of any ancillary health benefits from
changes in emission levels depends importantly on where (in which sectors) those
changes occur. 
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Wedding CGE models to adequate air dispersion models remains a research challenge,
not least because even a regional CGE does not usually incorporate a detailed locational
grid of emissions within the region of the sort needed for more sophisticated air
modelling. To illustrate the problem, suppose that, while coal-burning power plants
account for 50 per cent of regional particulate emissions and motor vehicles 20 per cent,
the latter contribute 60 per cent to ambient concentrations in the main regional
metropolis, while the former contribute only 30 per cent. Ideally, this locational effect on
the emissions-concentration relationship should be reflected in the basic dispersion
model, but without the benefit of a source-receptor matrix, one might mistakenly
conclude that a 10 per cent reduction in power plant emissions would reduce
concentrations and exposure in the big city by 5 per cent. Fortunately, although stack
height represents a separate influence from geographic location in dispersion models, the
former can to some extent proxy for the latter. This is because high-stack sources like
power plants tend in general to be more remotely located from dense population
concentrations than low-emission sources like automobiles, small industrial workshops,
cooking stoves, etc.  So, the lower coefficient on high-stack sources can be thought of as
capturing in part the effect of remote location.
Figure 3.1: Dispersion parameters by source emissions height





























The linearity assumption in the dispersion model is perhaps reasonable for some
pollutants, though not for all. In the case of particulates, it may be satisfactory as a
representation of the primary dispersion of particulate matter, but it does not capture
secondary particulate formation, which depends on the presence in the atmosphere of
primary gases like SO2 and NO2, and ammonia (Colls 1997). Also, ozone (O3) is the
product of complex atmospheric chemical reactions between NOx and VOCs in the
troposphere. 
3.2. DOSE-RESPONSE FUNCTIONS
Numerous dose-response studies exist linking air pollution to various endpoints – human
health effects, agricultural productivity, forest growth, materials damage, etc. It is beyond
the scope of this paper to review them (on human health effects, the reader is referred to
Appendix D of EPA 1998). Reflecting the strength of the epidemiological evidence, the
perceived relative health risks in developing countries, and the availability of monitoring
data, our attention focuses on a relatively few air pollutants, with particulates by far the
most important. In particular, the epidemiological literature finds a strong link between
respirable (PM10) and fine (PM2.5) particle7 concentrations and respiratory-related
mortality and morbidity. 
The results from multi-city U.S. studies of acute exposure to PM10 by Dockery, Pope and
colleagues are quite consistent, finding an estimated 0.7-1.5 per cent increase in natural
mortality associated with a 10 µg/m3 increase in PM10 concentration from mean levels in
the range 38-61 µg/m3 – i.e., several times lower than mean concentrations in many
developing-country cities. A meta-analysis of multiple particulate-mortality studies done
by Schwartz (1994) finds a consensus range for mortality increase estimates of between
0.7 and 1.0 per cent per 10 µg/m3 increase in PM10 concentration. Comparing their
estimates to those of other studies, Dockery et al. (1992) observe that the dose-response
relationship between particulates and mortality is remarkably similar across a large range
of concentrations, in a variety of communities, and with varying mixtures of pollutants
and climatology. There is no evidence of a “no effects”, or threshold, concentration – at
least not within the range observed in U.S. cities.
The robustness of the estimates is borne out by non-U.S. studies, including a handful in
developing countries. For instance, Ostro et al. (1996) find a significant relationship, for
Santiago, Chile, between ambient PM10 concentration and mortality after controlling for
confounding influences like temperature. In particular, the results from their basic OLS
model suggest that a 10 µg/m3 change in concentration around the mean (115 µg/m3) is
associated with a 0.6 per cent change in mortality8. Similarly, Chesnut et al. (1997) find
relative mortality risk changes in Bangkok, Thailand, very similar to those from U.S.
studies. The consistency of results between the U.S. and certain developing countries
suggests the possibility of transferring dose-response function coefficients in cases where
local studies are not available, assuming the target location is not drastically different
from the United States in terms of variables like time spent outdoors, baseline health
status, and medical care and access.
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Besides mortality, there are a variety of morbidity endpoints that may be affected by air
pollution, though few relationships are borne out as consistently by the epidemiological
literature as the PM10 – mortality link. There are two main ways in which the effects of
pollution on morbidity are measured: as incidence of physical symptoms and illness and
as behavioural responses to the symptoms/illness. The former are normally the object of
interest in clinical studies, while epidemiological studies may report on symptom/disease
incidence and/or effects on human activity. The most common measures for the latter are
“restricted activity days” (RADs), “work loss days” (WLDs), acute respiratory symptom
days, respiratory hospital admissions (RHAs), and emergency room visits. RADs are a
more comprehensive measure than WLDs, including days spent in bed, days missed from
work, and other days when normal activities are restricted due to illness (Cifuentes and
Lave 1993). They are also a more subjective measure and thus susceptible to greater
measurement error.  
The dose-response functions for morbidity endpoints appear to be more variable between
developed and developing country sites than those for particulate-related mortality. Thus,
the Chesnut et al. study finds that the central estimates of relative risk are roughly
comparable for RHA between Bangkok and the United States, cases per million
population differ considerably, with Thailand’s lower number reflecting the weaker
propensity to seek hospital care for respiratory symptoms. On the other hand, the number
of acute respiratory symptom days is far higher in Bangkok than in the United States.
Thus, for these morbidity endpoints, dose-response coefficient transfer across countries
could be more problematical than for mortality.
Table 3.1. provides central estimates, based on the available epidemiological evidence, of
the slope coefficients of the dose-response functions linking major air pollutants to
various health endpoints. These are the dose-response relationships incorporated in the
models for Chile and India, though in the Indian case concentration data were only
available for the first three pollutants. In Dessus and O’Connor (1999), lead was included
in the analysis for Chile, but in their more recent paper (2001) it is not. 
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Premature mortality/100,000 pop. 6.72 0.006







Clinic visits for LRI/child age < 15 0.0028
Respiratory symptoms/person 1.83 0.55
Respiratory symptoms/adult 0.10
Respiratory symptoms/1,000 children 16.9 0.18
Asthma symptoms/asthmatic 0.33 0.68





Hypertension/million males age > 20 72,600
Non-fatal heart attack/million males
age 40-59
340
Note: For blank cells, there is no known significant relationship between the pollutant and health
endpoint.
Sources: Ostro (1994); Ostro et al. (1998); Schwartz and Dockery, 1992; World Bank (1994).
4. VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
There are three broad approaches to valuation of environmental benefits in general and
ancillary benefits of climate policies in particular (see Freeman, 1993, for the classic text
on valuation methods). The first approach tallies productivity losses or costs to the
economy from illness, premature death, or damage to crops, materials and ecosystems.
From a theoretical standpoint it is the least satisfactory, not being firmly grounded in
welfare economics. It can, however, provide a lower bound estimate of “true” benefits.
The other two approaches – the first based on revealed preferences and the second on
stated preferences – are more firmly grounded on individuals’ utility functions, but they
are not without their own measurement problems. 
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In most health effects valuation exercises, mortality benefits tend to dominate morbidity
ones, largely because of the high value individuals attach to reducing the risk of
premature death. As explained above, in our analysis we rely wherever possible upon
stated or revealed preference methods of evaluating a statistical life. 
The problem the developing country researcher often faces is the paucity (often the total
absence) of studies estimating VSL for his or her own country, hence, the need to rely on
“benefits transfer” from sites more frequently studied, most commonly the United States.
That is only the beginning of the problem, however, as the VSLs estimated in different
U.S. studies are “all over the map”. Thus, in a review of 26 studies valuing mortality
benefits, Viscusi (1992) finds that the lowest and highest estimates of VSL differ by a
factor greater than 20 – ranging from $600,000 to $13.5 million (at 1990 prices). It is
possible to fit a distribution to these estimates (as done in Appendix I of EPA 1998, with
a Weibull distribution offering the best fit). Still, while the mean value is $4.8 million per
premature death avoided, the standard deviation is $3.24 million, suggesting a wide
margin for uncertainty in “benefits transfer”. 
Most of the U.S. studies from which VSL estimates are derived calculate compensating
wage differentials for higher on-the-job exposure to the risk of fatality. From such
hedonic wage estimation one can derive an estimate of VSL. For instance, if it is found
that, on average, a worker receives a wage differential of $350 per year for assuming an
added risk of accidental death on the job of 1/10,000, then this implies a VSL of $3.5
million. When one transfers this estimate out of the context in which it was derived – e.g.,
to one of mortality risk from pollution – there are at least four possible sources of bias,
two having to do with different risk characteristics and two with different risk preferences
of affected groups of individuals. First, assuming complete information, job-related risk
is voluntarily assumed, while risk from pollution exposure is largely involuntary. Second,
the time dimension of the risks can differ. For example, certain risks from pollution
exposure are delayed until later in life, and people may value differently risks avoided
now to those avoided later (see Krupnick 2001). With respect to the current analysis, this
is not a serious problem, since we are concerned principally with the short-term effects of
acute exposure to particulates and other air pollutants, not so much with long-term effects
of chronic exposure. 
Third, populations may differ in their attitudes towards risk. There may be some selection
bias in hedonic wage studies if risk-averse individuals self-select into safer jobs. In that
event, the results of such studies would provide a downwardly biased estimate of WTP
for risk reduction of the entire working age population.
This raises a fourth issue, which is that the age profile of the sample used in a hedonic
wage study may not be very representative of the age profile of the high-risk population
from air pollution. In the United States, the high-risk groups are primarily the elderly, the
infirm, and the very young. In the case of India, Cropper et al. (1997) find for Delhi that,
while the overall particulate-related mortality risk is only about one-third of that found in
U.S. studies9, the age group at greatest risk is also quite different: the 15-44 age group
versus those over 65 years in the United States. Clearly, this can make a difference to
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calculation of life-years lost, though how big a one depends on the difference in life
expectancies between the United States and a particular developing country10. As for
contingent valuation of VSL, however, Krupnick (2001) and his colleagues find for a
sample of Canadians that, below the age of 70, age does not seem to matter to willingness
to pay for reduced mortality risk11. Those in the 70-75 age group were willing to pay one-
third less than the average for a given reduction in mortality risk. Since in developing
countries the number of people who survive to that advanced age is still rather small (in
Delhi, e.g., 70 per cent of deaths occur before the age of 65), the use of VSL estimates
from random population samples would not appear to introduce serious bias.
Beyond these four issues in VSL transfer across contexts and populations, transfer of VSL
estimates from a developed country source site to a developing country target site poses
another issue – viz., how to adjust for differences in per capita income, hence in ability to
pay. One needs to scale the VSL for these differences, but a simple ratio of per capita
incomes would only be the appropriate scaling factor if the income elasticity of VSL (or
more broadly WTP) is equal to unity. The formula for calculating WTP in a target
developing country, given a WTP (or VSL) estimate for a wealthy source country like the
United States is:
WTPT = WTPS (1- ξwtp,y(YS - YT )/YS ),
where T and S subscripts refer to the target country and the source country, respectively, Y
stands for per capita income, and ξwtp,y is the elasticity of WTP with respect to per capita
income. What empirical evidence is there on the size of this elasticity? As with the VSL
itself, estimates vary fairly widely. Until recently, the few studies available suggested that
the elasticity is positive but less than one: in other words, survival is a necessity. In their
benefits transfer study of air pollution in Central and Eastern Europe, Krupnick et al.
(1996) assume an elasticity of 0.35 (based on contingent valuation studies reported in
Mitchell and Carson 1986). Studies estimating WTP for pollution-related morbidity
benefits also find an income elasticity less than unity, with Loehman and De (1982)
estimating a range from 0.26 to 0.60 for reduced respiratory symptoms from cleaner air in
Tampa, Florida, Alberini et al. (1997) an elasticity of 0.45 for similar benefits in Taiwan,
and Liu et al. (2000) an elasticity of a mother’s WTP to prevent a cold of 0.3 (for her
child) to 0.4 (for herself). On the other hand, Hammitt et al. (2000) find, from a
longitudinal (16-year) compensating wage differential study for Taiwan, that “survival is
a luxury good”, estimating an income elasticity of VSL of between 2 and 3. A meta-
analysis of VSL studies by Bowland and Beghin (1998) yields a similar elasticity
estimate. 
Why is the choice of ξwtp,y important? A simple numerical example makes this clear.
Suppose one is planning to transfer the VSL value mentioned above from a meta-analysis
of U.S. studies (EPA 1998) to China. In 1998, China’s PPP per capita income was 1/10th
that of the United States. So, if we were to assume ξwtp,y = 1, then 1/10 becomes the
adjustment factor. Since the U.S. VSL is $4.8 million, China’s must be $480,000. What
happens if instead we use ξwtp,y = 0.5 or ξwtp,y = 2.0. In the former case, we have by the
above formula (with monetary values expressed in ‘000 US$):
WTPT = 4,800 [1- 0.5(29.6 - 3.1)/29.6] = 4,800 - 2,149 =  2,651
26
In the latter case, we have:
WTPT = 4,800[1- 2.0(29.6 - 3.1)/29.6] = 4,800 - 8,595 =  - 3,795,
which is a nonsensical result. This is because, mathematically,
WTPT ⇒  0 as ξwtp,y ⇒  YS /((YS - YT )
So, in this case, any value of ξwtp,y > 1.11 would result in negative WTP for China.
Table 4.1 (borrowed from Dessus and O’Connor 2001) provides an illustration of how
different values of ξwtp,y would translate into different benefits transfer values for various
health endpoints between the United States and Chile. 















7,058 4,376 3,035 1,694 $/event Cost of illness( COI)
Emergency room visit
(ERV)
199 123 86 48 $/event COI
Restricted activity day
(RAD)
57.5 35.7 24.7 13.8 $/day Wages foregone
Minor restricted activity
day (MRAD)




237,604 147,314 102,170 57,025 $/case CV
Asthma attack 33.4 20.7 14.4 8.0 $/attack day CV
Respiratory symptom day 6.7 4.2 2.9 1.6 $/day CV
Child respiratory
symptom day
5.4 3.3 2.3 1.3 $/day CV
Adult chest discomfort
case
6.7 4.2 2.9 1.6 $/event CV
Eye irritation 6.7 4.2 2.9 1.6 $/event day CV
Headache episode (avg. of
mild and severe)
27.2 16.9 11.7 6.5 $/event day CV
Notes:
1992 PPP exchange rate: 186 Chilean pesos/USD
Ratio: PPP per capita income (Chile/US), 1992: 0.24
Sources: Krupnick et al. 1996; EPA 1998, Appendix D; Beghin et al. 1999.
Another way in which the elasticity matters is when, as here, the analysis is dynamic,
involving simulations over future time. Clearly, as per capita income rises in the
simulation, how fast VSL will rise depends critically on the assumed value of ξwtp,y.
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While the discussion thus far has focused on the valuation of health impacts, other
impacts may be of interest. In our ongoing study of China12, for example, the focus is on
agricultural yield impacts of altered tropospheric ozone and particulate haze levels as a
result of climate policy. In this case, the valuation of impacts is rather straightforward, in
that agricultural commodities are priced in markets, so any yield effects translate directly
into changes in quantities exchanged and possibly also prices. Even this analysis is
complicated, however, by so-called feedback effects. Thus, if local air pollution reduces
crop yields, then a policy that lowers that pollution will improve those yields and, if
relative prices are affected, this will in turn altering resource allocation across sectors. In
effect, the policy lowers an external cost to farmers of growing their crops and, assuming
that this cost reduction is not fully offset by the combination of reduced output prices and
increased input costs as a result of the carbon tax, farming becomes more profitable. This
in turn should result in a changed resource allocation, with more resources flowing into
the farming sector. A change in economic structure, however, will also lead to a change
in emissions levels, which will in turn affect agricultural yields. The likelihood is that, if
resources shift into agriculture from elsewhere in the economy, this will lower air
pollution (since agriculture is among the least-air-polluting sectors), having a further
positive effect on yields. Whether (and how quickly) this process converges depends on
three things: the shape of the crop dose-response curves, how marginal input costs change
with the tax, and the elasticities of the crop demand and supply curves.
A graphical exposition is given in Figure 4.1. If there are diminishing returns to
additional improvements in local air quality (e.g., to a reduction in tropospheric ozone
levels), this implies that the crop yield curve is non-linear, as shown in the first panel
(based on Figure 3 of Aunan et al. 2000; see also Chameides et al. 1999). Thus, the
marginal improvements in yield decline for each additional unit reduction in pollution.
Then, the supply curve for a particular commodity will shift out proportionately less for
each incremental reduction in pollution (Panel B). If marginal input costs are also
increasing in pollution abatement (or, put differently, in the carbon tax – see Figure 1.A
above), then each incremental unit of abatement would cause a proportionately bigger
leftward shift of the supply curve (Panel C). At some point, the two forces – of yield
improvements at a diminishing rate, and of input cost increases at an increasing rate –
would balance each other, with the result that at that abatement rate there would be no
further shift in the crop supply curve and the economy would settle into a new
equilibrium. Exactly where the new equilibrium would be – with what crop price/quantity
combination – will in turn depend on the elasticities of supply and demand. 
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Effect of Input Cost Increase on Supply Curve
P D S (abate 3) S (abate 2) S (abate 1) 
S (baseline)
Note: (abate 1) = (abate 2) = (abate 3) in volume terms.
In the cases of both health impacts and agricultural crop yields, the noted ancillary
benefits are only part of the story and, depending on the time horizon of the analysis, the
other part of the story may be more or less important. That other part consists in the
effects on health and on agriculture of climate change itself, hence of averting climate
change. Looking out a decade to the first Kyoto commitment period, these primary
effects of climate change are not likely to be easily detectable and quantifiable. What is
even more certain is that, in that time horizon, the effects on global temperature and
climate of any interim measures to curtail GHG emissions would be vanishingly small.
So, for the purpose of short-term analysis, they can safely be ignored.   
5. BASELINE AND POLICY SIMULATIONS: ESTIMATING SCOPE FOR “NO REGRETS”
We are now ready to begin the model simulations, first establishing a plausible growth
baseline and then conducting policy experiments in terms of deviations from emissions
baseline. 
5.1. THE BASELINE SIMULATION
The construction of a plausible baseline requires, for a start, a reasonable degree of
certainty about mid-term economic prospects. This is fairly easy for countries
characterised by long periods of macroeconomic stability, but much more difficult for
those vulnerable to shocks.  In the long-run, one could simply focus on trend growth,
abstracting from cyclical fluctuations, but in a decadal timeframe shocks can matter –
witness Latin America’s “lost decade” following the Mexican debt crisis of the early
Q
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1980s. For countries like China and India, where macroeconomic instability is less of a
problem, projecting GDP growth for a decade does not pose insurmountable problems.
Other important assumptions include the evolution of energy consumption in relation to
GDP. As explained above, this is dealt with – albeit mechanically – by the assumption of
a certain rate of autonomous energy efficiency improvement (AEEI), usually one per cent
per annum. The most problematic is what to assume about environmental policy
evolution over the scenario period. Will government become more determined and
effective in its efforts to control local air pollution, and if so by how much? Inevitably,
the assumption one must make on this score is somewhat arbitrary, though past
performance can provide some guidance. Thus, if particulate emissions have continued to
rise despite the imposition of stringent emission standards, it may be a fair guess that they
will continue to do so for some time. Nevertheless, a useful rule of thumb would be to
give the government the benefit of the doubt when establishing a local emissions
baseline. In this way, one cannot be accused of “loading the dice” in favour of large
ancillary benefits. An example of such a “conservative” baseline is given in Figure 5.1
for Chile, conservative notably in that particulate (PM10) emissions are assumed to rise
very slowly to 2010. One noteworthy feature of this baseline is that CO2 emissions rise
faster than energy consumption. This is not a general phenomenon across countries but
reflects the initial heavy reliance of Chile on hydroelectric power, with the expectation
that spare hydro capacity will be able to meet only a small share of the country’s
incremental electricity demand. Thus, a larger share will be generated by fossil fuels.
Source:  Dessus and O’Connor (2001).














5.2. POLICY EXPERIMENTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
The policy experiment consists in constraining CO2 emissions to be some given
percentage below baseline emissions by 2010. The means of constraining emissions is, as
explained above, the imposition of a national tax based on the carbon content of fuels. It
was also noted earlier that national authorities would normally be the ones to decide on
climate policy like a carbon tax, so the choice of a single national tax instrument
corresponds most closely to political realities. It is not an entirely innocuous choice,
however, as the India study shows. There, there are four regional economic models, with
abatement costs and ancillary benefits both calculated at the regional level. These can,
and do, vary across regions. Microeconomics tells us that, for cost minimisation,
abatement costs of different economic actors (whether firms or in this case regions)
should be equated at the margin. The bigger the cost differences across regions,
moreover, the greater the cost savings from using a common tax rate versus having
region-specific emission targets and tax rates. Figure 5.2 shows the regional marginal
abatement cost curves, as given by the carbon tax required to achieve a given percentage
CO2 reduction from baseline, region by region. As can be seen, the E region has the
lowest abatement costs and W and S the highest. So, with a single national tax, E will
abate proportionately more CO2 and W and S proportionately less. This solution would
minimise national abatement costs.
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Cost-effectiveness, Optimality and Equity
This is not the end of the story, however, since ancillary benefits also vary considerably
across regions, reflecting differences in the weights of different types of source and
differences in population exposure. Thus, an optimal allocation of abatement effort would
be one in which each region was abating to the point where its regional marginal costs
were equal to regional marginal (≅  average) ancillary benefits. Thus, if the national
government were to set a common national carbon tax, and if it were concerned with
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interregional equity, it would need to use some of the revenue from the tax to compensate
the “loser” – in this case, the South which, as Table 5.1. shows, does not appear to enjoy
any net benefits from such a tax even at the low abatement rate of 5 per cent. To
complicate matters further, the Table also points to another problem, viz., that even if a
region is one of the larger net beneficiaries of the policy, when ancillary benefits are
valued, it may be a relatively large loser in terms of conventionally measured disposable
income (as for example with E).  Since disposable income shows up in national income
statistics and ancillary benefits do not, policy makers might well have a hard sell to
convince E that it ought to agree to compensate S for the latter’s welfare losses.  
Table 5.1: Welfare Costs and Net Benefits, by Region of India- 2010
Reduction in CO2 emissions % (Final year Simulation wrt Final year BAU)
5 10 15 20 25 30
As % of Real GDP
Welfare Costs
Nor.EV -0.08 -0.19 -0.37 -0.76 -1.25 -1.64
Wes.EV -0.11 -0.27 -0.50 -0.95 -1.53 -2.04
Sou.EV -0.10 -0.25 -0.47 -0.89 -1.43 -1.89
Eno.EV -0.13 -0.29 -0.52 -0.96 -1.51 -1.96
Total -0.10 -0.25 -0.46 -0.89 -1.43 -1.89
Net Benefits
Nor.NetBenefits 0.27 0.49 0.64 0.57 0.39 0.32
Wes.NetBenefits 0.04 0.03 -0.06 -0.37 -0.79 -1.16
Sou.NetBenefits -0.01 -0.06 -0.19 -0.52 -0.97 -1.33
Eno.NetBenefits 0.14 0.23 0.25 0.06 -0.25 -0.44
Total 0.11 0.16 0.14 -0.09 -0.44 -0.70
% Change in:
Disposable Income (After Taxes)
Nor -0.26 -0.61 -1.10 -1.58 -2.21 -3.10
Wes -0.38 -0.88 -1.54 -2.17 -2.98 -4.23
Sou -0.20 -0.49 -0.90 -1.36 -1.96 -2.75
Eno -0.62 -1.36 -2.29 -3.13 -4.17 -5.67
Real GDP BAU Shares
Nor 25 -0.11 -0.26 -0.45 -0.75 -1.14 -1.50
Wes 34 -0.12 -0.28 -0.49 -0.81 -1.21 -1.61
Sou 24 -0.11 -0.26 -0.45 -0.76 -1.15 -1.52
Eno 17 -0.15 -0.34 -0.57 -0.91 -1.33 -1.71
India 100 -0.12 -0.28 -0.48 -0.80 -1.20 -1.58
Another aspect of equity that governments will almost certainly wish to consider is the
effect of the policy on inter-household income distribution. This requires, however, that
the analysis incorporate more than a single representative household. For that, household
expenditure survey data is needed both to group households into expenditure classes,
from the lowest to the highest, and to differentiate patterns of expenditure by expenditure
class. Short of such detailed analysis, a few tentative observations are possible, based on
what the model results show of the changes in labour income and capital income
respectively as a result of the carbon tax. Household income is derived largely from
factor ownership, with labour being the principal if not sole source of income for the poor
and capital figuring more prominently in the incomes of the rich. The policy simulation
shows that, while many sectors contract as a result of the carbon tax, a few expand, and
these tend to be among the most labour-intensive ones (agriculture, food processing,
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textiles and clothing). Prima facie, this would suggest that the relative demand for labour
is rising and, ceteris paribus, its relative return. This is indeed the case. Relative needs to
be stressed, as incomes earned by both capital and labour decline with the carbon tax.
Capital income, however, declines at a slightly faster rate than labour income, with the
result that the wage/rental ratio rises by about 1.4 per cent for a 15 per cent CO2
reduction. So, from this perspective, a carbon tax is mildly progressive. On the
expenditure side, of course, the story could be different if, for example, poor households
spend a higher proportion of their income than the rich on coal and other products with a
high coal content. There is also the question of the incidence of the ancillary benefits.
Here, if – as seems plausible – the poor tend to be more heavily exposed to outdoor air
pollution than those in the middle to upper income groups, then they should capture the
bulk of the benefits from cleaner air. The net distributional effects are ambiguous in the
absence of further analysis.
No Regrets Abatement and Its Decomposition
Figure 5.3 illustrates the “no regrets” rate of abatement for India in 2010 (using central
estimates of substitution elasticities and of WTP for health improvements). It corresponds
to a 15+ per cent reduction in emissions from the baseline (which implies that, instead of
growing by about 80 per cent between 1995 and 2010, CO2 emissions would grow by
only about 50 per cent).  Does this mean, then, that policy makers can confidently impose
a carbon tax calculated to reduce baseline 2010 emissions by 15 per cent? It would if we
were living in a world of perfect information and zero uncertainty. … In practice, not.
Hence the need for sensitivity analysis, to give policy makers a broader range of options,
depending on their degree of risk aversion.
Figure 5.3: No Regrets CO2 Abatement, India  (10^5 Rps)















We can decompose the CO2 emission reductions, either for the national economy or for
each region (in the case of India), into several components, including changes in: (i) the
sectoral composition of output, (ii) the carbon-intensity of energy, (iii) the energy
intensity of the economy, and (iv) the scale of production. Consider the following























where E is total emission volume, XtotOutput total output (in real terms), Ei the sectoral
emission volumes, Enei the sectoral fuel (energy) use, and XiOutput the sectoral outputs.
The first term on the right corresponds to (i), representing sector i’s share in total output;
the second term captures (ii), the carbon emissions intensity of energy consumption; the
third term (iii), the energy intensity of sectoral production; the fourth term (iv), the scale
of the economy. The total variation in emission levels can then be measured as the sum of






















































Table 5.2 shows the decomposition for the four regions of India. What is clear is the
dominant role played by a reduction in carbon-intensity of energy, through inter-fuel
substitution and a change in the energy mix. Improved energy efficiency of the economy
is usually the next most important source of emission reductions, with the exception of
the E region where shifts in the sectoral composition of output weigh more heavily. This
is presumably because of the heavy dependence of the latter on the coal mining sector
and energy-intensive industries that go into relative decline. Thus, resources must shift
out of this sector into others. The large scope for energy savings is consistent with studies
that find India’s heavy industries (e.g., iron and steel) to be well behind the world
efficiency frontier13.
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Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity analysis is performed to determine how dependent results are on the particular
values of certain key parameters and exogenous variables used in the simulations. There
are any number of sensitivities one could test, but theory-informed intuition is used to
select the few thought to be most important. These are the substitution elasticities14 in the
production function and the WTP values. (A proto-sensitivity-analysis was performed
above for the elasticity of WTP with respect to income – see Table 4.1, so that parameter
is not treated further.) In a longer-term exercise, one would also be interested in testing
alternative time paths of emission reductions. It is worth noting that the introduction of
ancillary benefits into the analysis of climate policy may significantly alter the standard
result that “it pays to wait” because of the prospect of future technological improvements
that will lower the costs of abatement. Now, these benefits of waiting need to be weighed
against the costs in terms of additional lives lost and poor health in the here and now.
Clearly the fact that we employ sensitivity analysis at all suggests that we are uncertain
about the “true” values of certain parameters. Thus, in conducting the analysis, it would
make sense to choose alternative values that bound a range of plausible estimates.
Ideally, this would involve specifying a statistical distribution such that one can assign a
specific probability to observing parameter values within the chosen range (e.g., 95%,
99%). This is not always possible (requiring at a minimum information about the
standard deviation around a sample mean). In that event, more arbitrary rules can be used
– e.g., multiplying substitution elasticity values by 0.5 and 1.5. This is what was done in
the case of India. In the case of VSL, the lower and upper bounds of the range of plausible
Table 5.2: Decomposition of CO2 Emission Changes, India by Region
5
Share of total CO2 reduction attributable
to change in: Nor Wes Sou Eno
Sectoral composition 10.2 6.3 7.0 21.6
Carbon-intensity of energy 65.9 71.2 68.5 55.7
Energy-intensity of output 17.4 16.2 18.7 16.2
Scale of production 6.4 6.3 5.9 6.5
10
Nor Wes Sou Eno
Sectoral composition 11.3 7.1 7.7 23.2
Carbon-intensity of energy 65.2 70.2 68.2 54.7
Energy-intensity of output 16.7 15.9 17.7 15.2
Scale of production 6.8 6.8 6.3 6.9
15
Nor Wes Sou Eno
Sectoral composition 11.6 7.4 7.9 23.5
Carbon-intensity of energy 65.1 69.6 68.2 54.9
Energy-intensity of output 16.1 15.6 17.1 14.4
Scale of production 7.3 7.4 6.8 7.2
Abatement rate (%)
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India-specific estimates15 was taken for the sensitivity analysis (the mid-point of that
range being the central VSL value employed) (see Bussolo and O’Connor 2001).
Figure 5.4 presents the combined results of a series of sensitivity analyses in which, first,
substitution elasticities in production were allowed to vary, holding WTP constant at
central values, then WTP was varied, holding substitution elasticities constant at default
values, then both substitution elasticities and WTP were allowed to vary. The “low
elasticity, low WTP” results in the first panel are the least favourable to “no regrets”
climate policy, while the “high elasticity, high WTP” results are most favourable. The
dashed vertical lines through the horizontal axis show the “no regrets” abatement rates
associated with each. Even in the least favourable case, the “no regrets” abatement rate is
in the 10-15 per cent reduction range relative to baseline 2010 emissions. Ten per cent,
then, would appear to be a “safe lower limit” on CO2 abatement for a risk-averse Indian
policy maker. It should be noted that, if we were to include other greenhouse gases in the
analysis, the “safe lower limit” would in all likelihood be raised insofar as other gases
offer low cost abatement options over some range16.
5.3. COMPARISON WITH OTHER RESULTS
We have presented the results generated by the CGE-based policy simulations, but are
these reasonable? What is our point of reference? There are several markers one can use
for cross-checking results, to see if they fall within a plausible range. (A caveat of such
comparisons is that it might just be that all the previous studies produced erroneous
results.) The most common metrics for the economic analysis of climate policy are: the
marginal cost of reducing a tonne of carbon (tC) (hence, the carbon tax rate) and, in the
case of ancillary benefits, the size of those benefits per tC reduction. The latter, in turn,
can be measured either in physical units (e.g., premature deaths avoided or, put simply,
lives saved per unit C reduction) or in monetary units. Our focus here is on the ancillary
benefits comparison.
In making cross study (and especially cross-country) comparisons of ancillary benefits, it
is important to bear in mind the several possible sources of variance in results, including
differences in: underlying parameter values or variable estimates – e.g., of VSL; method
of estimating benefits (e.g., damages avoided versus abatement costs avoided); scope of
benefits included (e.g., some studies include both emission-related benefits and non-
emission-related ones like reductions in traffic congestion, accidents, and noise resulting
from reduced road transport); population exposure to pollution across study sites.
Table 5.3 summarises calculations based on several studies that have looked at mortality
benefits from climate policy. Our results show lives saved per million tonnes of carbon
abated equal to 334, compared with 298 for China estimated by Garbaccio et al. The
numbers for Chile and the United States are considerably lower. These relative
magnitudes are broadly consistent with the hypothesis state above that developing
countries with few initial local pollution controls (hence, little delinking of CO2
emissions from other pollutants) are likely to benefit more climate policy – in terms of
lives saved per tC reduction – than developed countries where such delinking is more
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advanced. Another explanation for the high number of lives saved in China and India is
the high urban population densities, hence, the large exposed populations relative to Chile
and the U.S.A. 
Figure 5.4: Outer Bounds on   "No
Low Elasticities, Low WTP



























Table 5.3: Comparison of Mortality Benefits Estimates of CO2 Reductions
Study Lives saved per MtC 
reduction
Scenario Assumptions
Bussolo and O’Connor (2001) 334 India, 2010
15% CO2 reduction
Garbaccio et al. (2000) 298 China, 2010:
10% CO2 reduction
Dessus and O’Connor (1999) 100 Chile, 2010:
10% CO2 reduction
Cifuentes et al. (1999) 89 Chile, 2020:
13% CO2 reduction
Abt Associates (1997) 82 USA,  2010:
15% CO2 reduction
Source: O’Connor (2000); Bussolo and O’Connor (2001).
These health benefits of climate policy can also be expressed in value terms. Even if in
India the number of premature deaths averted per tC abated is quadruple that in the
United States, in value terms the difference will be smaller, given India’s much lower per
capita income, hence willingness (capacity) to pay for cleaner air. The ancillary benefits
per tC abated in India come to around $58 (at 1995 exchange rate). This compares with
one early U.S. estimate of around $26/tC from emission reductions in two sectors17 –
transport and electricity – which together account for about two-thirds of carbon
emissions (Ayres and Walter 1991). A more recent review for the U.S.A. by Burtraw and
Toman (1997) reports on the results of eight studies whose mean estimate of ancillary
benefits is virtually identical to the Ayres and Walter figure, with a low estimate of
around $3 and a high of $8918. 
European ancillary benefit estimates tend to be higher than those for the United States,
reflecting in part higher population exposure (due to higher urban population densities
and prevailing winds that blow pollution inland in Europe but out to sea from the eastern
United States). Considering only emission-related benefits, the values range (in 1990
$US) from a low of $20/tC (Barker, 1993, for the U.K., based on social preferences
revealed from the marginal costs of implementation of existing abatement technologies)
to a high of $212/tC (Alfsen et al.1992, for Norway; Pearce 1992 reports a similar figure
for the U.K.: $195/tC). A mean value of emission-related benefits, based on the estimates
reported in Ekins (1995), is around $100/tC. A more recent Europe-wide assessment
(Barker and Rosendahl, 2000) for the first Kyoto Protocol control period (2008-2012)
finds average ancillary benefits per tC equivalent of around $125 (at 2000 prices and
exchange rate). These benefits amount to between 15 and 40 per cent of the change in
GDP brought about by GHG mitigation measures, depending on the European country. 
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6. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
This paper has laid out the theory, methodology and some empirical results from the use
of economy-wide models to compare ancillary benefits to the primary costs of climate
policy in developing countries. A few results bear repeating.
First, the top-down modelling approach depends on the question at hand: it is best suited
to providing broad guidance to national policy makers who are concerned principally
with the economic costs of a carbon constraint. By integrated ancillary benefits into a
consistent modelling framework, it is possible to estimate the “no regrets” level of
abatement effort.
Second, the hypothesis seems to be borne out that countries that have undertaken
relatively little prior abatement of local air pollution stand to reap larger ancillary benefits
of climate policy than countries that have. While this does not always break down along
developing/developed country lines, the environmental Kuznets curve observed in some
of the data on pollution levels vs. per capita income suggests this is probably a good first
approximation. 
Third, this still leaves open the question of whether a country could get more for its
money, in terms of local pollution-related health benefits, by focusing on local air quality
targets rather than on greenhouse gas reductions. Limited evidence suggests that there
may be tradeoffs but that there can be considerable coincidence between cost-effective
local pollution control measures and cost-effective GHG control measures. In any event,
the intent of the analysis is not to suggest that policy makers ought to focus on climate
policy first. Rather, it is to call their attention to (and attempt to quantify) previously
overlooked or undervalued benefits of such policy, while fully recognising that their
priorities may well lie with local air pollution. In any event, the question of the
consistency of orderings between local abatement and global abatement cost-
effectiveness is an area requiring more country-specific research.
Fourth, the evidence suggests that, while dose-response function transfer from developed
to developing countries is justifiable for mortality from particulates exposure, it is more
problematic where the endpoint being measured involves an explicit behavioural
component, like self-medication, clinic visits, or hospital admissions. Even more
problematic is transfer of WTP/VSL estimates, especially given the sensitivity of the
derived value for the target site to the assumed income elasticity of WTP, on which
empirical evidence to date is far from consistent.
Fifth, there is a sense of incompleteness in an analysis that considers only the ancillary
(not the primary) benefits of climate policy – bearing in mind that costs are simply
negative benefits and that some countries might gain on net from climate change. The
rationale for this focus has been that developing country policy makers are likely to
discount heavily the distant future and highly uncertain primary benefits, while the
ancillary ones are far more certain and immediate. Still, in the final analysis, all
significant costs and benefits will need to be compared, as will the timing of controls. 
41
REFERENCES
Abt Associates Inc. (1997), “International PM Mortality Impacts in 2020 from
Greenhouse Gas Policies”, Memo from Leland Deck and Jennifer Jones, Abt, to
Dwight Atkinson and Tracey Woodruff, US EPA, dated 26 November.
Alberini, A., M. Cropper, T.-T. Fu, A. Krupnick, J.-T. Liu, D. Shaw, and W. Harrington
(1997), “Valuing Health Effects of Air Pollution in Developing Countries: The
Case of Taiwan”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 34:
107-126.
Alfsen, K.H., A. Brendemoen, and S. Glomsrod (1992), “Benefits of climate policies:
Some tentative conclusions”, Discussion Paper No. 69, Central Bureau of
Statistics, Oslo, Norway, March.
Armington, P. (1969), “A Theory of Demand for Products Distinguished by Place of
Production”, IMF Staff Papers, 16: 159-178.
Aunan, K., T.K. Berntsen, and H.M. Seip (2000), “Surface Ozone in China and Its
Possible Impact on Agricultural Crop Yields”, Ambio, 29(6), September 294-301.
Ayres, R.U., and J. Walter (1991), “The Greenhouse Effect: Damages, Costs and
Abatement”, Environmental and Resource Economics, 1: 237-270.
Barker, T. (1993), “Secondary Benefits of Greenhouse Gas Abatement: The Effects of a
UK Carbon-Energy Tax on Air Pollution”, Nota di Lavoro 32.93, Fondazione
ENI Enrico Mattei, Milan. 
Barker, T., and K.E. Rosendahl (2000) “Ancillary Benefits of GHG Mitigation in Europe:
SO2, NOx, and PM-10 reductions to meet Kyoto targets using the E3ME model
and EXTERNE valuations”, in OECD, op.cit., pp. 413-451.
Baumol, W.J., and W.E. Oates (1988), The Theory of Environmental Policy, Cambridge
Univeristy Press, Cambridge.
Beghin, J., B. Bowland, S. Dessus, D. Roland-Holst, and D. van der Mensbrugghe
(1999), “Trade Integration, Environmental Degradation, and Public Health in
Chile: Assessing the Linkages”, 11 May, processed.
Beghin, J., S. Dessus, D. Roland-Holst, and D. van der Mensbrugghe (1996), “General
Equilibrium Modelling of Trade and the Environment”, Technical Paper No. 116,
OECD Development Centre, Paris, September.
Bowland, B.J., and J.C. Beghin (1998), “Robust Estimates of Value of a Statistical Life
for Developing Economies: An Application to Pollution and Mortality in
Santiago”, CARD Working Paper 99-WP 214, Center for Agricultural and Rural
Development, Iowa State University, Ames, December.
Boyd, R., K. Krutilla, and W.K. Viscusi (1995), “Energy Taxation as a Policy Instrument
to Reduce CO2 Emissions: A Net Benefit Analysis”, Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, 29: 1-24.
Brandon, C., and K. Hommann (1995), “The Cost of Inaction: Valuing the Economy-wide
Cost of Environmental Degradation in India”, Asia Environment Division, World
Bank, 17 October, processed.
Burniaux, J.-M. (2000), “A Multi-Gas Assessment of the Kyoto Protocol”, Economics
Department Working Paper No. 270, OECD, Paris, 2 November, processed.
42
Burniaux, J.-M., G. Nicoletti and J. Oliveira-Martins (1992), "GREEN: a Global Model for
Quantifying the Costs of Policies to Curb CO2 Emissions", OECD Economic Studies, 19:
49-92.
Burtraw, D., and M. Toman (1997), “The Benefits of Reduced Air Pollutants in the U.S.
from Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Policies”, Discussion Paper 98-01, Resources
for the Future, Washington, D.C.
Bussolo, M., M. Chemingui, and D. O’Connor (2001), “A Multi-Region Social
Accounting Matrix (1995) and Regional Environmental General Equilibrium
Model for India (REGEMI)”, OECD Development Centre WebDoc #1,
forthcoming.
Bussolo, M., and D. O’Connor (2001), “Clearing the Air in India: The Economics of
Climate Policy with Ancillary Benefits”, OECD Development Centre Technical
Paper No. 182, November, Paris.
Chameides, W.L., H. Yu, S.C. Liu, M. Bergin, X. Zhou, L. Mearns, G. Wang, C.S.
Kiang, R.D. Saylor, C. Luo, Y. Huang, A. Steiner, and F. Giorgi (1999), “Case
study of the effects of atmospheric aerosols and regional haze on agriculture: An
opportunity to enhance crop yields in China through emission controls?”, PNAS,
96(24): 13626-13633.
Chesnut, L.G., B.D. Ostro, and N. Vichit-Vadakan (1997), “Transferability of Air
Pollution Control Health Benefits Estimates from the United States to Developing
Countries: Evidence from the Bangkok Study”, American Journal of Agricultural
Economics, 79(5): 1630-1635.
Cifuentes, L.A., and L.B. Lave (1993), “Economic Valuation of Air Pollution Abatement:
Benefits from Health Effects”, Annual Review of Energy and the Environment,
18: 319-342. 
Cifuentes, L.A., E. Sauma, H. Jorquera, and F. Soto (1999), “Co-controls Benefits
Analysis for Chile: Preliminary estimation of the potential co-control benefits for
Chile”, COP-5 Progress Report, School of Engineering, Pontifical Catholic
University of Chile, October, revised 12 November. 
Colls, J. (1997), Air Pollution: An Introduction, E&FN SPON, Chapman & Hall,
London.
Cropper, M.L., N.B. Simon, A. Alberini, S. Arora, and P.K. Sharma (1997), “The Health
Benefits of Air Pollution Control in Delhi, India”, American Journal of
Agricultural Economics, 79(5): 1625-1629.
Dahl, C. (1995), “Demand for Transportation Fuels: A Survey of Demand Elasticities and
Their Components”, The Journal of Energy Literature, I(2): 3-27.
Dessus, S., and D. O’Connor (1999), “Climate Policy without Tears: CGE-Based
Ancillary Benefits Estimates for Chile”, OECD Development Centre Technical
Paper No. 156, Paris, November.
Dessus, S., and D. O’Connor (2001), “Climate Policy without Tears: CGE-Based
Ancillary Benefits Estimates for Chile”, Environmental and Resource Economics,
final revisions submitted in June.
Dessus, S., D. Roland-Holst, and D. van der Mensbrugghe (1994), “Input-based Pollution
Estimates for Environmental Assessment in Developing Countries”, Technical
Paper No. 101, OECD Development Centre, Paris.
43
Dockery, D.W., J. Schwartz, and J.D. Spengler (1992), “Air Pollution and Daily
Mortality: Associations with Particulates and Acid Aerosols”, Environmental
Research, 59: 362-373.
Dowlatabadi, H. (1998), “Sensitivity of climate change mitigation estimates to
assumptions about technical change”, Energy Economics, 20: 473-493.
Ekins, P. (1995), “Rethinking the Costs Related to Global Warming: A Survey of the
Issues”, Environmental and Resource Economics, 6, pp.231-277.
EPA (1998), The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1970 to 1990, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C.
EPA (2000), Developing Country Case-Studies. Integrated Strategies for Air Pollution
and Greenhouse Gas Mitigation: Progress Report for the International Co-
Control Benefits Analysis Program, November.
Eskeland, G.S., and T.N. Feyzioğlu (1997), “Is demand for polluting goods manageable?
An econometric study of car ownership and use in Mexico”, Journal of
Development Economics, 53: 423-445.
Eskeland, G.S., and J. Xie (1997), “Acting Globally while Thinking Locally: Is the
Global Environment Protected by Transport Emission Control Programs?” World
Bank, Washington, D.C., processed.
Fankhauser, S. (1995), Valuing Climate Change, Earthscan, London.
Freeman, A. M., III (1993), The Measurement of Environmental and Resource Values:
Theory and Methods, Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C.
Garbaccio, R.F., M.S. Ho, and D.W. Jorgenson (2000), “The Health Benefits of
Controlling Carbon Emissions in China”, Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, 16 March, processed.
Goulder, L.H., and S.H. Schneider (1999), “Induced technological change and the
attractiveness of CO2 abatement policies”, Resource and Energy Economics, 21:
211-253.
Hammitt, J.K., J.-T. Liu, and J.-L. Liu (2000), “Survival is a Luxury Good: The
Increasing Value of a Statistical Life”, prepared for NBER Summer Institute
Workshop on Public Policy and the Environment, Cambridge, MA, August.
Hettige, H., P. Martin, M. Singh, and D. Wheeler (1995), “The Industrial Pollution
Projection System”, Policy Research Working Paper 1431, The World Bank,
Washington, D.C., March.
IEA (1995), World Energy Outlook, Paris.
Jorgenson, D.W., R.J. Goettle, P.J. Wilcoxen, and M.S. Ho (2000), The Role of
Substitution in Understanding the Costs of Climate Change Policy, The Pew
Center on Global Climate Change, Washington, D.C., September.
Kolstad, C.D. (2000), Environmental Economics, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Kolstad, C.D., and M. Toman (2001), “The Economics of Climate Policy”, RFF
Discussion Paper 00-40REV, Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C., June,
processed.
Krupnick, A.J. (2001), “How Much Will People Pay for Longevity?” Resources, Winter,
142: 14-17.
Krupnick, A., K. Harrison, E. Nickell, and M. Toman (1996), “The Value of Health
Benefits from Ambient Air Quality Improvements in Central and Eastern Europe:
44
An Exercise in Benefits Transfer”, Environmental and Resource Economics, 7:
307-332.
Liu, J.-T., J.K. Hammitt, J.-D. Wang, and J.-L. Liu (2000), “Mother’s Willingness to Pay
for Her Own and Her Child’s Health: A Contingent Valuation Study in Taiwan”,
Health Economics, 9: 319-326.
Lluch, C. (1973), “The Extended Linear Expenditure System”, European Economic
Review, 4: 21-32.
Loehman, E., and V.H. De (1982), “Application of Stochastic Choice Modelling to
Policy Analysis of Public Goods: A Case Study of Air Quality Improvements”,
Review of Economics and Statistics, 64(3): 474-480. 
Lvovsky, K., and G. Hughes (1998), “Addressing the Environmental Costs of Fuels in
Developing Countries”, presented at First World Congress of Environmental and
Resource Economists, 25-27 June, Venice, Italy.
Lvovsky, K., G. Hughes, D. Maddison, B. Ostro, and D. Pearce (1999), Environmental
Costs of Fossil Fuels: A Rapid Assessment Method with Application to Six Cities,
World Bank, processed.
Markandya, A. (1998), “The indirect costs and benefits of greenhouse gas limitations”,
Handbook Reports: Economics of Greenhouse Gas Limitations, UNEP
Collaborating Centre on Energy and Environment, Risø National Laboratory,
Roskilde, Denmark.
McKibbin, W.J., and P.J. Wilcoxen (1995), “The Theoretical and Empirical Structure of
the G-Cubed Model”, November, processed.
Mitchell, R.C., and R.T.Carson (1986), Valuing Drinking Water Risk Reduction Using
the Contingent Valuation Method: A Methodological Study of Risks from THM
and Giardia, Report to U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C.
O’Connor, D. (2000), “Ancillary Benefits Estimation in Developing Countries: A
Comparative Assessment”, in OECD, op.cit., pp. 377-396.
OECD (2000a), “A Multi-Gas Assessment of the Kyoto Protocol”, Working Party No. 1
on Macroeconomic and Structural Policy Analysis, 29 September, Paris.
OECD (2000b), Ancillary Benefits and Costs of Greenhouse Gas Mitigation. Proceedings
of an IPCC Co-Sponsored Workshop, held on 27-29 March 2000, in Washington,
D.C., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris.
Ostro, B. (1994), “Estimating the Health Effects of Air Pollutants: A Method with an
Application to Jakarta”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1301,
May.
Ostro, B., J.M. Sanchez, C. Aranda, and G.S. Eskeland (1996), “Air Pollution and
Mortality: Results from a Study of Santiago, Chile”, Journal of Exposure Analysis
and Environmental Epidemiology, 6(1): 97-114.
Pearce, D. (1992), “The Secondary Benefits of Greenhouse Gas Control” CSERGE
Working Paper 92-12, April (revised), processed.
Pearce, D. (2000), “Policy Frameworks for the Ancillary Benefits of Climate Change
Policies”, in OECD, op. cit., pp.517-560.
Pearce, D. (2001), “How developing countries can benefit from policies to control
climate change”, in L. Gómez-Echeverri (ed.), Climate Change and Development,
Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies, New Haven, CT.
45
Roy, J., J. Sathaye, A. Sanstad, P. Mongia, and K. Schumacher (1999), “Productivity
Trends in India’s Energy Intensive Industries”, Ernest Orlando Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratory, April; published in The Energy Journal, 20(3): 33-
61.
Schwartz, J. (1994), “Air pollution and daily mortality: A review and meta-analysis”,
Environmental Research, 64: 36-52.
Shukla, P. (1996), “The Modelling of Policy Options for Greenhouse Gas Mitigation in
India”, Ambio, 25:4, June, 240-248.
Simon, N.B., M.L. Cropper, A. Alberini, and S. Arora (1999), “Valuing Mortality
Reductions in India: A Study of Compensating Wage Differentials”, Working
Paper No.2078, World Bank Policy Research Department, January.
Smith, K.R. (1993), “Fuel Combustion, Air Pollution Exposure, and Health: The
Situation in Developing Countries”, Annual Review of Energy and the
Environment, 18: 529-66.
Tol, R.S.J. (1995), “The Damage Costs of Climate Change – Towards More
Comprehensive Calculations”, Environmental and Resource Economics, 5: 353-
374.
Viscusi, W. K. (1993), “The Value of Risks to Life and Health”, Journal of Economic
Literature, 31: 1912-1946.
Weitzman, M.L. (1974), “Prices vs. Quantities”, Review of Economic Studies, 41: 477-
491.
WHO (1989), Management and Control of the Environment, WHO/PEP/89.1, Geneva.
World Bank (1994), Chile. Managing Environmental Problems: Economic Analysis of
Selected Issues, 19 December (Report No. 13061-CH).
46
TECHNICAL APPENDIX: ELEMENTS OF THE MODEL STRUCTURE
This Appendix presents the basic mathematical structure of the production and
consumption sectors of the CGE models used in the analysis; also the determination of
aggregate investment . (See Bussolo et al. 2001 for further details.)
Production structure
Recall text Figure 2.2 that presents the production nesting.  
At the top level, the producer chooses a mix of a value-added-plus-energy19 aggregate

























where PjKEL is the aggregate price of value added plus energy, PjN is the price of the
intermediate aggregate, ajKEL and ajN are the CES share parameters, and ρ is the CES










Note that in the model, the share parameters incorporate the substitution elasticity using
the following relationships:
( ) ( )σσ αα NjNjKELjKELj aanda ==
Each subsequent production nest in Figure 2.2 is subject to an equivalent optimisation
rule.
Consumption structure 
Consumers under the ELES are assumed to maximise the following utility function:
max ln( ) lnU C S
Pi i i si
= − + 

∑µ θ µ
subject to the budget constraint:






C is consumer spending, S is saving (in value), Yd is disposable income, PC are consumer
prices, and µ and θ are the ELES parameters.20 The Engel aggregation condition requires





The following demand functions can be derived:
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The usual interpretation of this demand function is that consumption is composed of two
parts. The first part has been referred to as the subsistence minimum (or floor
consumption), θ. The term in parenthesis represents residual income after subtracting
expenditures on the subsistence minima. Therefore the second part of consumption of any
given sector’s output is a share of supernumerary income. Note that there is no minimal
consumption of savings, i.e., θs is 0. Savings can be determined via the budget constraint:
























= − −( )1 1
The income elasticity is equal to the ratio of the marginal propensity to consume good i
out of supernumerary income, µ, over the average propensity to consume good i out of
income.
Investment determination
Appendix Table 1 includes the equations for the closure of the saving and investment
account. The domestic India-wide value of investment – the product of investment price
index PI, and the investment volume ITOT – is equal to domestic saving (households and
government savings) plus foreign saving, plus depreciation, less expenditure on building
stock.























                                                
1 Pearce (2001) cites damage estimates for non-OECD countries from a doubling of atmospheric CO2
equivalent concentration for non-OECD countries of between 1.6% of GNP (Fankhauser 1995) and 2.7%
of GNP (Tol 1995).
2 Biomass fuel is normally a by-product of another productive sector – whether agriculture, livestock, or
forestry. While the marketed outputs of these sectors get reflected in the I/O tables, it is not legitimate to
apply the same technical coefficients to these by-products.
3 Dowlatabadi (1998) provides some illustrations of how endogenising technical change can affect the
analysis of optimal climate policy. For example, with induced technical change, postponing climate policy
significantly raises costs of achieving the agreed target by foregoing important learning opportunities.
Goulder and Schneider (1999) extend this analysis, suggesting that (in the absence of prior R&D tax
distortions) induced technical change can increase the gross social costs of a given carbon tax, though this
is more than offset by increased benefits. Thus, the optimal level of abatement is higher. Viewed
differently, for a given abatement target, the gross social costs are lower with induced technical change
than without.
4 VSL can be alternately expressed as the value of a premature death avoided and is estimated by individual
willingness to pay (WTP) for small reductions in the risk of premature death from specific causes (whether
on-the-job accidents or pollution-related illness). Algebraically, VSL = Value of ∆risk/ ∆risk. So, for
instance, if the average WTP for a 1/100,000 reduction in the risk of premature death (say, associated with
a 10µ/m3 reduction in PM10) is $50, then the VSL implied by that WTP is $50/(1/100,000), or $5 million.
5 To illustrate the role of temperature and humidity, according to one estimate, concentrations of particulate
matter from a fixed quantity of emissions in hot and dry regions are about one-third of what would be
expected from the same emissions under most other climatic conditions (Working Group 1997).
6 Ideally, region- or city-specific information on atmospheric conditions can be found to determine these
frequencies, but if not then certain “default” frequencies can be used as an approximation.
7 Particle size is measured in terms of “aerodynamic diameter” and is given in units of microns (thousands
of a millimeter); thus PM10 refers to particles with diameter of 10 microns or less and PM2.5 has an
equivalent interpretation.
8 The relationship between PM10 and mortality is non-linear, however, with a change evaluated at 50 µg/m3
associated with a 1.4 per cent increase in mortality (i.e., closer to the U.S. means) and one evaluated at 150
µg/m3 increasing mortality by 0.4 per cent.
9 Likewise, a recent study for Santiago, Chile, revises down earlier estimates by Ostro of the particulates
dose-response relationship. While Cifuentes et al. (2000) broadly confirm the statistical significance of the
relationship found by Ostro et al. (1996) for PM2.5–mortality, the dose-response coefficient is found to be
only about half as large, with the difference attributable to controls for seasonal effects.
10 In the case of the United States and India, as of 1998 life expectancy at birth was 77 and 63 years
respectively; WDI Indicators CD-ROM of the World Bank.
11 This raises the vexed question of whether a sample of Canadians is representative of anyone other than,
well, a sample of Canadians ;).
12 It is too early to present results of policy simulations for China, so the discussion in section 5 focuses just
on health impacts.
13 IEA (1995), for example, estimates India’s 1992 energy use per tonne crude steel at 0.94 toe, compared
to 0.34 in the Republic of Korea and 0.33 in Japan (Table 5.10).
14 Roy et al. (1999) suggest, e.g., that while raising energy prices in India would be an effective carbon
abatement policy, it could be costly given what they estimate to be relatively weak inter-input substitution
possibilities. If a policy maker shared this assessment, then s/he might be interested in knowing the effect
of assuming lower substitution elasticities than the central values used in Bussolo and O’Connor (2001).
15 See, e.g., Brandon and Hommann (1995); Simon et al. (1999).
16 See Burniaux (2000) for a multi-gas assessment of the Kyoto Protocol, in which the savings from abating
across three gases rather than just CO2 averages $26/tCeq for the Annex I countries in 2010.
17 The benefits estimates are based on the assumption of a 20% reduction in air pollution from 1978 levels.
18 Burtraw and Toman propose a “rule-of-thumb” (for the United States) that ancillary benefits can be
assumed to be roughly 30% of the cost of carbon reduction for low to moderate rates of abatement.
Observing that over some range the marginal costs of GHG reductions are likely to be close to zero, they
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conclude that the existence of ancillary benefits even as small as $3/tC could significantly increase the
volume of emissions reduction that is considered “no regrets” in the sense of having negative or zero net
cost.
19 Due to the crucial importance of energy in terms of pollution, the demand for energy has been separated
from the rest of intermediate demand, and incorporated in the value added nest.
20 In the utility function, S needs to be deflated by an appropriate price, which would represent the
consumer spot price of future consumption. This price does not need to be specified for the model since
household saving can be derived as a residual from the budget constraint. For welfare calculations, the
consumer price index, cpi, has been chosen as the saving deflator since there is no forward-looking
behaviour in REGEMI.
